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Résumé / Abstract
Avec la croissance apparaissent de nouveaux besoins de protection
de l’environnement. Nous étudions les règles d’investissement optimales lorsque
les décisions sont irréversibles et les dépenses indivisibles. Une attitude myope
consistant à ne prendre en compte que les données immédiates du problème sans
considération des investissements futurs ni de ceux d’autres juridictions
simplifie énormément l’analyse et mène dans certains cas aux décisions
optimales. Dans un modèle à deux pays où chaque pays bénéficie des
investissements de l’autre, la chronologie d’investissement choisie lorsque les
pays doivent investir tour à tour constitue également un équilibre lorsque l’ordre
d’intervention est endogène.
As development proceeds, the demand for environmental protection
increases. We study optimal investment decision rules when protection
investments are irreversible and indivisible. We show that myopia (focusing on
one particular outlay without considering investments that are to come later in
the sequence or are to be made by another jurisdiction) does not lead to errors
in timing but greatly simplifies decision analysis. In a two country setup where
each outlay benefits both countries, we also find that the equilibrium time
sequence that arises when both countries must take turns to invest is also an
equilibrium when the order is endogenous.
Mots Clés : Options réelles, investissement, environnement, externalité, myopie
Keywords : Real options, investment, environment, externality, myopia
1 Introduction
Imagine a nite world with increasing human activity and population.
Some resources that were felt to be limitless progressively become scarcer.
In some cases markets may establish themselves so that the resource be-
comes a tradable good or asset. Sometimes, especially in the early phase
of the rarefaction process, transaction costs or other impediments pre-
vent the existence of true markets.
Many environmental issues may be usefully analyzed within such a
context. Thus air quality, water supply and quality, the climate, may
be viewed as emerging goods, whose opportunity cost is not yet high
enough to be fully incorporated into human activities, or whose oppor-
tunity cost has not been perceived high enough for institutions to be
developped that would promote the internalization of that cost. In fact
the whole Malthusian tradition which is so central to environmental eco-
nomics revolves around the implications of growth and expansion.
This paper belongs to that tradition in that it models a growing envi-
ronmental problem or, more precisely, the growing benets from control
or abatement actions. It will not focus on changing institutions however,
but it introduces another feature which is often important in environmen-
tal problems: the irreversibility, and the indivisibility, of conservation or
abatement investments. Thus the creation of a national park, the con-
struction of a water purication plant, or the introduction of legislation
protecting air quality are all investments of some magnitude that are, to
a large extent, irreversible.
In fact the methodology used is that of real option theory, a eld in
which much research activity has been taking place recently (see in par-
ticular Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). In the resource literature, this interest
dates back at least to Henry (1974), and Arrow and Fisher (1974). More
recently, Baranzini et al (1994) applied real option theory to the problem
of global warming, while Saphores and Conrad (1996) used that method-
ology to analyze pesticide spraying. Clearly the presence of uncertainty,
combined with the magnitude and irreversibility of the investments in-
volved in environmental protection make that methodology a prefered
tool for the investigation of many environmental problems. It provides
a tool for analyzing not only the desirability, but also the timing, of
investments.
Although, to our knowledge, papers in the environmental eld have
focused on one particular investment decision, the real option literature
has dealt extensively with successions of investments, options whose ex-
ercise open new options. We will consider a succession of investments
here, focusing on their desirability and timing in the traditional fash-
1
ion. We will also ask a more neglected question: to what extend is it
necessary to know the sequence of future possible investments in order
to make decisions with regard to the next candidate? This question is
not usually considered in the real options literature because the option
literature emphasizes option valuation. Clearly the value of a project
which opens up a succession of new opportunities is not the same as
the value of the same project, without the new opportunities it creates.
However, in some circumstances, the date at which the project should
be undertaken is the same in both cases. When this is true, the analysis
of the investment decision may be simplied radically. Such is the case
with the model presented below.
Our objective is to characterize optimal investment decision rules
and to characterize the evolution of abatement or environment protec-
tion activities as development proceeds in a stochastic way, rst under
a centralized system, then when there are two competing jurisdictions.
Such investment decisions involve the acquisition or exercise of real op-
tions. Exercizing such options amounts to giving up the opportunity to
use future information, a cost that leads to a delay in the decision.
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In the next section, we present the model; in the following section we
derive the socially optimal investment sequence and discuss some of its
properties. Then, in Section 4, we introduce and solve a model involving
two countries and an abatement externality.
2 The model
We envisage the development of an economy and the concomitant rise in
an environmental problem. That problem may be mitigated by reducing
the damage through specic irreversible investments which we normal-
ize in such a way that each investment reduces damage by one unity or
less. Thus if x such unit investments have already been made, the asso-
ciated damage reduction is D (x) and its value to society, which depends
on the state of development Y (t) reached at date t is Y (t)  (x (t)) =
R
x(t)
0
Y (t)D (y) dy. It may be thought of as the value of the consumer
surplus arising from damage reduction. Y (t) is positive and tends to
1
As Abel, Dixit, Eberly and Pindyck (1996) illustrate with their generalized in-
vestment model, all those options need not in fact delay investments. In their model,
rms can expand by acquiring new capital but possibly at a higher cost than its
current one; this reduces the value of the call option that delaying investment carries
and therefore it increases the current incentive to invest. The rm can also disinvest
by selling some of its capital but possibly at a lower price than its original cost; this
reduces the put option which investing now carries and which complete irreversibility
ruled out, and therefore it reduces the current incentive to invest.
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grow over time. D is strictly decreasing if positive, continuously dier-
entiable on
 
0; D
 1
(0)

, with D
 1
(0) = lim
p!0
D
 1
(p) <1; xD (x) is
strictly concave on
 
0; D
 1
(0)

.
Let

i be the smallest integer equal to or higher than D
 1
(0). We
assume that
R
1
0
D (x) dx <1 and we dene  (i), the value (divided by
Y ) of the consumer surplus increment associated with the i
th
abatement
unit as
 (i) =
(
R
i
i 1
D (x) dx ; i = 1; : : : ;

i  1
R
D
 1
(0)
i 1
D (x) dx ; i =

i
Note that  (i) =
P
i
1
 (j). Since D is strictly decreasing
 (1) >  (2) > : : : >  (

i) (1)
Y follows a geometric Brownian motion
dY = Y dt+ Y dz (2)
with 0 <   r, r being the discount rate; r    is dened as . The
perfect certainty case arises when  = 0, when Y rises at the constant
rate .
We will study situations where Y is low initially and has never been
high enough for any abatement capacity to be present, whatever the
institutional context considered. The cost of each unit is H in current
value and is constant over time,
Society (countries) is (are) risk neutral and discount future revenues
at rate r. Abatement units have no alternative use and do not depreciate.
When we envisage the presence of two countries, we index them by A
and B, and we note x = x
A
+ x
B
. We will alternatively consider
and compare two types of behavior on the part of society or countries:
perfect foresight, and myopia. By myopia we mean that countries ignore
the inuence on future benets of both their own future actions and
their competitors' future actions. However, unlike Leahy (1993) who
considered atomistic, competitive, rms, a myopic country is assumed
to take into account the current impact of its, and its competitors',
actions.
3 Socially optimal abatement capacity ac-
quisition
What is the socially optimal abatement capacity acquisition program in
such a setup? It is possible to formulate the problem at hand in terms of
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the state variable Y (t). Let Y
i
be the lowest value of the state variable
at which the i
th
unit of abatement capacity must be acquired and T
i
as the date at which its acquisition occurs. By denition T
i
 T
i+1
;
i = 1; :::

i, and, obviously, Y (0)  Y
i
 :::  Y

i
. The social planner's
problem may be written as follows:
max
Y
1
;:::;Y

i
E
(
Z
1
0
"
Z
x(t)
0
e
 rt
Y (t)D (z) dz
#
dt 

i
X
i=1
e
 rT
i
H
)
(PS1)
where :
x (t) =
8
<
:
0 if t < T
1
i if T
i
 t < T
i+1
; i = 1; :::;

i  1
D
 1
(0) if T

i
 t
(3)
T
i
= inf ft j Y (t)  Y
i
g i = 1; :::

i (4)
Note that, if T
i
= T
i+1
, (3) implies that x (t) is never equal to i but jumps
from i  1 or less to i+1 or more. Since Y (t) is a stochastic process, T
i
is a random variable; hence in the objective function of (PS1), E must
be understood as the expected value taken over the T
i
's given the Y
i
's
and the constraints of the problem.
(PS1) may be alternatively written as the following problem:
max
Y
1
E

Z
1
T
1
e
 rt
Y (t) (1) dt  e
 rT
1
H

(5)
+ : : :+max
Y
i
E

Z
1
T
i
e
 rt
Y (t) (i) dt  e
 rT
i
H

+ : : :+max
Y

i
E

Z
1
T

i
e
 rt
Y (t) (

i) dt  e
 rT

i
H

subject to (3) and (4)
Thus the planner's problem may be divided into a set of independent
problems. For the i
th
problem, the solution takes the form of a rule
stating that the i
th
unit of abatement capacity must be acquired when
Y reaches Y
i
for the rst time, at T
i
. Let m (Y; i) be the welfare function
associated with that sub-problem. Since E
n
R
1
T
i
e
 rt
Y (t) (i) dt
o
=
E
n
e
 rT
i
Y
i
(i)

o
,
m (Y; i) = max
Y
i
E

e
 rT
i

Y
i
 (i)

 H

j T
i
= inf ft j Y (t)  Y
i
g

(6)
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Problem (6) is a stochastic dynamic programming problem. When Y
is (and has always been) suciently low that the i
th
unit has not been
acquired yet and is not to be acquired in the next interval dt, Bellman's
equation is m
Y
Y +
1
2
m
Y Y

2
Y
2
  rm = 0. Given that m must vanish
if Y goes to zero, its solution is B
i
Y
b
where b is the positive root of the
quadratic equation:
Q (y) = :5
2
y[y   1] + y   r = 0 (7)
The constant B
i
may be found by invoking the value matching and
smooth pasting conditions; these conditions imply
Y
iS
=
H
 (i)
b
b  1
(8)
B
iS
=

 (i)
b

b

b  1
H

1 b
(9)
m
S
(Y; i) =

 (i)
b

b

b  1
H

1 b
Y
b
(10)
where again the subscript
S
refers to a social optimum. According to
(8) ; at the date of the investment, the value of the cumulative surplus
generated by the new unit, capitalized at the discount rate r, exceeds
the cost of acquiring that unit. Equations (1) and (10) also imply that
m
S
is decreasing in i: the value to society of the option to invest one
day in the i
th
abatement capacity unit is decreasing in i.
The presence of uncertainty has the eect that investing now implies
giving up the possibility to use future information. Consequently the
threshold value Y
iS
may be shown to be higher than under certainty and
to increase with . In fact, since b is the positive root of (7), it can be
shown, replacing  by r   ; that 
b
b 1
= r +
1
2

2
b. Thus (8) may be
written as Y
iS
 (i) = H

r +
1
2

2
b

, which means that the proper notion
of user cost is r (as under certainty) augmented with the rental value to
society of remaining exible
1
2

2
b.
Now imagine that the social planner is myopic in the sense mentioned
earlier: she does not consider any action beyond her current decision.
Facing the decision to acquire the i
th
abatement capacity unit, such a
myopic social planner solves
max
Y
i
E
Z
1
T
i
e
 rt
Y (t) (i) dt e
 rT
i
H subject to T
i
= inf ft j Y (t)  Y
i
g
(11)
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instead of
max
Y
i
;:::;Y

i
E
8
<
:
Z
1
0
"
Z
x(t)
0
e
 rt
Y (t)D (z) dz
#
dt 

i
X
j=i
e
 rT
j
H
9
=
;
subject to T
j
= inf ft j Y (t)  Y
j
g , j = i; :::;

i
As was shown above, the complete problem is separable into components
such as problem (11). Consequently, the solution Y
iS
of (11) is part of
the non myopic solution. The myopic social planner would understate
society's welfare if it used the solution of (11) to evaluate it, thus ignoring
the subsequent abatement options, but she would time the investment
correctly. Thus the following proposition.
Proposition 1 By using a myopic abatement rule, a social planner in-
vests in the best interest of society, although it understates society's wel-
fare.
This result is reminiscent of a similar result established by Leahy
(1993) for competitive rms with indenitely divisible capital. Its intu-
ition is the same: by being myopic, the country underestimates by the
same amount the value of its option to remain exible, and the marginal
benet from investing. This leaves the investment rule unaected.
4 The two-country case
In this section we examine what happens if the environmental damage
aects two countries, A and B, while the cost of abatement is born by
whichever country invests in the abatement measure. Although this may
also be modelled as a partial externality we focus on the pure externality
case. Thus the benets from each damage reduction are equally shared
by both countries, while the cost is born by that country which imple-
ments the damage reduction measure. Strategic behavior may occur as it
is in each country's interest to let the other bear the cost. But there may
be dierences in outcomes depending on the institutional constraints and
on the technological framework under which the countries operate. In
particular we will consider two alternative situations: when each abate-
ment decision in the sequence is unambiguously identied with one of the
two countries; and when each investment may be made by one country
or the other indierently. We start with the rst alternative.
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4.1 Case 1: Exogenously given investment sequence
In order to clarify the exposition, we assume that abatement decisions
alternate between countries, with A having to make the rst one. We also
assume that no country may skip its turn so that, for example, A cannot
introduce its second abatement measure before B has implemented its
rst one.
We dene a country's welfare as the expected cumulative ow of
abatement benets, discounted to the current date, net of the expected
discounted abatement costs that the country will incur in the future.
Let W
A
(Y; i
A
; i
B
) be the welfare of country A when it holds i
A
units
of abatement capacity while the other country holds i
B
units. Given
the assumptions on D (x), there are maxima

i
A
and

i
B
to the num-
ber of units that each country will ever consider acquiring, so that
i
A
2 I
A
= f1; 3; :::;

i
A
g and i
B
2 I
B
= f2; 4; :::;

i
B
g, with

i
A
+

i
B
=

i.
Assuming that both countries share equally in the benets from damage
reduction
W
A
(Y; 0; 0) =
max
Y
i
; i2I
A
E
(
1
2
Z
1
0
"
Z
x(t)
0
e
 rt
Y (t)D (z) dz
#
dt 
X
i2I
A
e
 rT
i
H
)
(CA)
where :
x (t) =
8
<
:
0 if t < T
1
i if T
i
 t < T
i+1
; i = 1; :::;

i  1
D
 1
(0) if T

i
 t
T
i
= inf ft j Y (t)  Y
i
g i 2 I
A
(12)
For i 2 I
B
Y
i
is dened by the converse problem, which denesW
B
(Y; 0; 0).
We start with a particular case where each country is constrained
to a maximum abatement capacity of one. Thus consider a situation at
date t where country A already holds its abatement unit while the other
country does not. Their current welfare functions are W
A
(Y; 1; 0) and
W
B
(Y; 0; 1) : It is B's turn to make an abatement decision: B must nd
Y
2
the value of Y at which it should invest.
2
The solution also denes
B's welfare from t onward
W
B
(Y; 0; 1) = max
Y
2
E
t
(
1
2
Z
T
2
t
e
 r[ t]
Y ()  (1) d
+ e
 r[T
2
 t]

W
B
(Y
2
; 1; 1) H

o
(CB)
2
It must be the case that Y has already reached Y
1
at least once and has never
reached Y
2
.
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where the welfare of B once it has acquired its abatement capacity is
W
B
(Y; 1; 1) =
1
2
Y  (2)

=W
A
(Y; 1; 1) (13)
The second equality in (13) indicates that A's welfare is the same as B's
once the last abatement decision has been implemented by B.
In order to solve (CB), let us decompose W
B
as W
B
(Y (t) ; 0; 1) =
Y (t)
1
2
 (1) dt+E
t

e
 rdt
W
B
(Y (t+ dt) ; 0; 1)
	
, which, after expanding
e
 rdt
W
B
(Y (1 + dt) ; 0; 1) aroundW
B
(Y (t) ; 0; 1), applying Ito's lemma
and some manipulations, gives (we omit the
B
exponent and function
arguments when no ambiguity may arise)
1
2
 (1)Y +W
Y
Y +
1
2
W
Y Y

2
Y
2
  rW = 0 (14)
The general solution of this non homogenous linear dierential equation
is W = B
2
Y
b
+

BY

b
+
1
2
(1)Y

where
1
2
(1)Y

is a particular solution and
B
2
Y
b
+

BY

b
is the solution to the homogenous part of the equation. The
constant

B must be null if the value of the welfare function is to vanish
when Y goes to zero; consequently the solution must be of the form
W
B
(Y; 1; 0) = B
2
Y
b
+
1
2
(1)Y

. One notes that
1
2
(1)Y

is the expected
value of B's cumulated welfare if abatement capacity stays at 1 forever,
i.e. if B never invests; consequently, B
2
Y
b
must represent the impact of
B's investment option on B's welfare. In order to determine B
2
one has
to use the value matching and smooth pasting conditions. At Y
2
, when B
invests, the value matching condition isW
B
(Y
2
; 0; 1) =W
B
(Y
2
; 1; 1) H
or
B
2
Y
b
2
+
1
2
Y
2
 (1)

=
1
2
Y
2
 (2)

 H (15)
The smooth pasting condition is W
B
Y
(Y
2
; 0; 1) =W
B
Y
(Y
2
; 1; 1) implying
B
2
bY
b
2
+
1
2
Y
2
 (1)

=
1
2
Y
2
 (2)

(16)
Since  (2)  (1) =  (2), it follows that
Y
2X
=
H
1
2
 (2)
b
b  1
(17)
B
2X
=

1
2
 (2)
b

b

b  1
H

b 1
(18)
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where the '
X
' subscript refers to the exogeneity of the investment se-
quence assumed in case 1. A comparison with (8) and (9), taken at
i = 2, reveals that Y
2X
= 2Y
2S
and B
2X
=

1
2

b
B
2S
: the second invest-
ment occurs later, at a development level twice higher, than is socially
desirable, and, since b > 1, it can be shown that the welfare achieved
by B is less than half the combined welfare of A and B under the so-
cially optimal scheme at the same level of Y (chosen, for comparison
purposes, such that the second investment has not occurred under the
socially optimal scheme or under the conditions of case 2.
Now consider country A's problem when A knows that B cannot
make any move before A has acquired its abatement unit:
W
A
(Y; 0; 0) = max
Y
1
E
t
n
e
 r[T
1
 t]

W
A
(Y
1
; 1; 0) H

o
(19)
where, for T
1
   T
2
W
A
(Y; 1; 0) = E

(
Z
T
2

e
 r[t  ]
1
2
Y (t)  (1) dt+ e
 r[T
2
  ]
1
2
Y
2
 (2)

)
(20)
The rst term in the expected value corresponds to benets that A
shares with B until B's abatement investment occurs; the second term
corresponds to the period following B's investment.
One notes that, unlike previous expected welfare functions which
were dened by some maximization problem, there is no decision involved
in the denition ofW
A
(Y; 1; 0); the investment in the second abatement
unit is B's, not A's, decision. Nevertheless let us apply to the right-hand
side of (20) the same treatment as is done in dynamic programming prob-
lems in order to establish Bellman's equation. Assuming that Y is low
enough for B not to enter in the next interval dt, let us decomposeW
A
as
W
A
(Y; 1; 0) = Y (t)
1
2
 (1) dt + E
0

e
 rdt
W
A
(Y (0 + dt) ; 1; 0)
	
, which,
after expanding e
 rdt
W
A
(Y (0 + dt) ; 1; 0) around W
A
(Y (0) ; 1; 0), ap-
plying Ito's lemma and some manipulations, gives (we omit the
A
expo-
nent until ambiguity may arise)
1
2
Y (1) +W
Y
Y +
1
2
W
Y Y

2
Y
2
  rW = 0 (21)
This dierential equation is the same as the one found to be satised
by W
B
(Y; 0; 1) (see (14)). As the latter, its solution is of the form
W (Y; 1; 0) = 
1
Y
b
+
Y
1
2
(1)

; the term
Y
1
2
(1)

is A's expected cumu-
lated welfare if abatment capacity stays at 1 forever, i.e. if B never
invests; consequently, 
1
Y
b
must represent the impact on A's value
9
of B's investment; however, unlike the case of B, since (20) does not
involve an optimization, there are no value matching or smooth past-
ing conditions to determine 
1
and Y
1
. In order to nd these param-
eters, let us proceed from the following remark. As already noted,
at Y
2X
, just after the entry of B, A and B have the same welfare
(they have the same abatement capacity and share the same benets
equally): W
B
(Y; 1; 1) = W
A
(Y; 1; 1) =
1
2
(2)Y

. Furthermore, since the
entry of B is anticipated, the welfare of A does not jump at B's entry:
W
A
(Y
2
; 1; 0) =W
A
(Y
2
; 1; 1). Substituting explicit forms one has

1
Y
b
2
+
Y
2
1
2
 (1)

=
Y
2
1
2
 (2)

Substituting (17) for Y
2
gives

1
= b

b  1
H

b 1

1
2
 (2)
b

b
(22)
Having established that W
A
(Y; 1; 0) = 
1
Y
b
+
Y
1
2
(1)

, we may now
study the entry decision of A, problem (19). This problem diers from
(CB) in that the rm does not enjoy any welfare ow while waiting
to invest into abatement capacity. As a result Bellman's equation is
homogenous and its solution is B
1
Y
b
where B
1
is to be determined from
the value matching and smooth pasting conditions
B
1
Y
b
1
= 
1
Y
b
1
+
Y
1
1
2
 (1)

 H (23)
bB
1
Y
b 1
1
= b
1
Y
b 1
1
+
1
2
 (1)

(24)
These conditions imply, since  (1) =  (1)
Y
1X
=
H
1
2
 (1)
b
b  1
(25)
B
1X
= 
1
+

b  1
H

b 1

1
2
 (1)
b

b
=

b  1
H

b 1
"
b

1
2
 (2)
b

b
+

1
2
 (1)
b

b
#
(26)
where, again, the X subscript has been added to refer to the exogeneity
of the abatement investment sequence. Thus, according to (25), the rst
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abatement investment also occurs at a level of Y twice higher than is
socially optimal and, as a result, welfare is lower than would be socially
possible.
It is simple, perhaps somewhat tedious, to extend this two-country
model to cases where each country has the possibility to invest in any
number of abatement capacity units in alternating (or exogenously given)
order. The procedure requires nding the maximum number of abate-
ment units that will be introduced by each country (such a maximum
exists under the assumptions made on D (x)) and then establishing the
welfare functions in backward chronological order as above.
Now suppose that countries A and B are myopic in the sense men-
tioned earlier: when considering the introduction of an abatement mea-
sure, each country ignores any subsequent abatement decision that it, or
the other country, may take in the future. Thus, going back to the simple
case solved above where each country may invest at most once, country
A, when studying its abatement decision, instead of solving (CB), will
solve
max
Y
1
Ef
Z
1
T
1
e
 rt
Y (t)
1
2
 (1) dt  e
 rT
1
Hg (27)
More generally, in the absence of any constraint on the number of abate-
ment decisions, a myopic country would consider that problem instead
of problem (CA) and a similar simplication would apply to the choice of
any subsequent abatement investment. Solving (CB) one nds that the
option to invest in the rst abatement unit, when evaluated that way, is
worth B
1x
Y
b
and
Y
1x
=
H
1
2
 (1)
b
b  1
B
1x
=

1
2
 (1)
b

b

b  1
H

b 1
where the '
x
' subscript refers to the exogeneity of the abatement invest-
ments sequence, but in a context of myopic decisions. While B
1x
< B
1X
,
which implies that its myopia leads the country to underestimate its
welfare by neglecting to take account of subsequent options, Y
1x
= Y
1X
,
implying that the myopia has no eect on the investment timing. This
result may be generalized to situations where the countries do not face
any abatement capacity limit.
Finally, it is interesting to note that B's welfare is higher than A's.
This result can be explained by the fact that both countries enjoy the
same ow of amenities derived from abatement measures, but dier by
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the timing of their expenditures. The country which gets to invest later
enjoys a higher welfare.
The results applying to case 1 are gathered into the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 2 In the two country model with exogenously given invest-
ment sequence:
1. each abatement capacity unit is acquired later than is socially de-
sirable;
2. if they use a myopic investment rule, the countries make the same
decisions as if they addressed the complete investment sequencing
problem with foresight; however, by so doing they understate the
welfare gains to be expected from future abatement actions.
3. The country which gets to invest the latest enjoys the highest wel-
fare.
4.2 Case 2: Endogenous investment sequence
If the order in which the countries make their expenditures is endoge-
nous, one might expect each country to try to avoid adopting any abate-
ment measure, in the hope that the other country will do it instead. By
so doing a country would hope to get the benets of abatement at no
cost. Consider again the simple case of two countries and a maximum to-
tal number of two abatement investments. Any one of the two countries
may invest 0, 1, or 2 units in any order.
Without getting involved into the formal analysis, it is possible to
describe the pure strategy equilibria of that game.
3
First note that a
strategy consisting, for each country, in never investing whatever the
other country does, cannot be an equilibrium. A slight modication of
the analysis presented in Case 1 shows that, when Y reaches Y
1X
not
investing is not be a best response by A to a strategy of never investing
by B.
Now consider the following pair of pure strategies for A and B. For
A, invest one unit if Y  Y
1X
and no unit has yet been installed; and do
not invest otherwise. For B, invest one unit if Y  Y
2X
and the number
of installed units is less than 2; and do not invest otherwise. It is easy
to check that this pair of pure strategies yields a Nash equilibrium to
any subgame starting at any t  0 with any combination of Y and of
3
For a treatment of mixed strategy equilibria in the spirit of the present study,
see the duopoly model of Boyer, Lasserre, and Moreaux (1997).
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iA
2 f0; 1; 2g, i
B
2 f0; 1; 2g such that i
A
+ i
B
 2. Thus the equilibrium
described in the previous case remains a (sub-game perfect) equilibrium
when the sequence of investments is endogenous.
However this is not the only Nash equilibrium: inverting the roles of A
and B yields another one. More interestingly, a third sub-game perfect
equilibrium results from a strategy of never investing by B, combined
with the following strategy for A: if Y
2X
> Y  Y
1X
and no unit has
yet been installed, then invest one unit, and do not invest otherwise;
if Y  Y
2X
then invest either one unit if one unit has already been
installed, or invest two units if no unit has yet been installed, and do
not invest otherwise. In that equilibrium, A pays all the costs while B
free rides happily.
This generalizes to cases involving a limitless number of abatement
investments.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have presented and analyzed a model of economic ex-
pansion with rising environmental problems. These problems give rise to
a demand for abatement or control, which in turn provides investment
opportunities in these areas. We have focused on investments such as the
creation of national parks and protected areas or the introduction of anti-
pollution standards, i.e. on decisions characterized by their irreversibil-
ity, their indivisibility, and the public good nature of their consequences.
To be socially optimal, these investments must be sequenced in such a
way that each of them occurs when the level of development has reached
some critical value. At that time, the expected discounted present value
of the benets from the investment must be strictly higher than the cost
of the investment. An ecient environmental policy requires abatement
measures to be taken early enough. However one should not intervene
too early: as we have shown, at the time of investment, the benets
from the abatement must strictly exceed the cost of the intervention.
This result is not due to the uncertainty surrounding the decision; in
fact it holds even in the absence of such uncertainty, although uncer-
tainty increases the spread between expected discounted present value
and cost.
Not surprisingly, when two countries share the benets, but not the
costs, of the abatement investments, these investments occur later than
is socially optimum. More surprisingly, within the social optimization
model as well as in the Nash equilibrium framework of the two-country
model, the level of development at which a particular investment is called
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for is the same whether the decision maker(s) behave(s) myopically, ig-
noring all decisions to be taken in the future, or consider(s) and evalu-
ate(s) the whole sequence of subsequent investments.
Extensions to situations when the positive externality from abate-
ment is not pure, i.e. to situations where the country that invests bene-
ts more than the other country are left for a sequel. One may conjecture
that, in such situations, the desire to preempt might oset the tempta-
tion to free ride, so that the abatement investment sequence might not
be too conservative despite the externality.
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